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I chose upstanding men 
That climb the streams until 
The fountain leap, and at dawn 
Drop their cast at the side 
Of dripping stone; I declare 
They shall inherit my pride, 
The pride of people that were 
Bound neither to Cause nor to State, 
Neither to slaves that were spat on, 
Nor to the tyrants that spat 
WB Yeats, The Tower (1926) 
 
The rhetorician would deceive his neighbours, 
The sentimentalist himself; while art 
Is but a vision of reality. 
WB Yeats, Ego Dominus Tuus (1919) 
 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned 
WB Yeats, The Second Coming (January 1919) 
 
the true natural art of statecraft […] will first test 
them in play, and after the test will entrust them in 
turn to those who are able to teach and help them  
to attain the end in view 
Plato, Statesman (308C-D) 
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1. Introduction: The Anthropological Foundations of Social Theory 
 
This paper argues that Huizinga’s Homo Ludens is not simply a classic work of cultural 
history, but lays the anthropological foundations of the understanding of social life, 
comparable to, and complementing, similar works by Marcel Mauss on gift-relations, 
Simmel on sociability, and Tarde and Girard on imitation. However, play can also 
become problematic, even demonic, and modern art and politics is much based on the 
use and abuse of this demonic aspect of playfulness. 
The paper will consist of three parts. The first will introduce Huizinga’s 
foundational work, focusing on the importance of contest for the promotion of socially 
relevant excellence, interpreting ‘contesting’ as ‘con-testing’ or ‘joint proving’, sparked by 
Agnes Horvath’s ideas on the significance attributed by Plato to wrestling. The second 
will present the archetype of the modern demonic clown, the Pierrot figure as renewed 
by Jean-Gaspard Debureau after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and 
‘discovered’ in 1828 by French radical Romantics as capturing the truth of the human 
condition, reading into a rancorous and bitter circus clown Isaiah’s figure of the 
‘Suffering Servant’. The third part will present an ultimate stage of this development in 
Meyerhold’s Russian avant-garde theatre, pioneered before and perfected after the 
Bolshevik revolution, with its glorification of mechanisation and industrialism, the 
‘taylorization of theatre’ through his innovative ‘biomechanics’, and his landmark 
corrupting of acting through the techniques of ‘puppetisation’ and ‘out-casting’. 
2. Huizinga: play as foundational of culture 
 
The writings of Johan Huizinga constitute one of those classic works in social theory that 
everybody refers to and yet nobody knows or uses in any depth. His ideas on the ‘waning 
of the Middle Ages’, on the Netherlands of the 17th century, on Erasmus of Rotterdam, 
or on the ‘play element of culture’ are mentioned in any related work in its first pages, so 
that the real substance of Huizinga’s ideas could then be safely ignored in the rest, 
substituted by more ‘up-to-date’ literature. This section will offer a detailed analysis of 
this crucial classic work Homo Ludens (Huizinga 1970[1950]) by contrasting and 
comparing it to the similarly fundamental-anthropological approaches of René Girard 
(1977[1972]) and Marcel Mauss (2002[1924-5]).  
Just as Girard, Huizinga was trained as a historian, but in contrast to Girard’s 
obsession with violence and sacrifice, mistakenly considered as foundational and not 
situational, and showing affinities with the work of Mauss, Huizinga shifts the focus to 
an area that has all but ignored by anthropologists, and social scientists in general: play.1 
With his emphasis on the playful elements of human life, and the related aspects of 
beauty, joyfulness and harmony, Huizinga offers an antidote to Girard’s tendency to 
apocalyptic gloom. 
 The issues at stake in Homo Ludens are captured in its sub-title, and its fate. It was 
intended as ‘The Play Element of Culture’, but repeatedly changed by editors and proof-
readers to ‘The Play Element in Culture’, and published finally in this manner, in spite of 
protests from the author. They all agreed that one just cannot possibly suggest that the 
origin of culture is simply play; even more, that it is joyful, self-erasing, innocent 
playfulness. 
 Yet, this is exactly what Huizinga is suggesting; and the first steps taken to 
substantiate his claims are immediately striking. Playfulness, as a feature, far from being 
restricted to humans, is also shared by animals; while among humans, it is particularly 
characteristic of children. One could explain this by the need for education, and connect 
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it to mimesis, but this for Huizinga does not exhaust the significance of playfulness for 
animals or children, as they, especially when playing, are also particularly graceful.2 
 The joint gracefulness and playfulness of animals and children can be further 
illuminated through another much-neglected area in social analysis: laughter. Animals do 
not laugh; children, on the contrary, laugh particularly frequently – and also cry 
particularly frequently. The laughing of children is also particularly graceful, while the 
laughter of adults can often be quite opposite. The central question concerning the 
joyous playfulness and graceful laughter of animals and children is the following: is this 
something purely preliminary, primitive, a necessary preparation for ‘serious’ adult life; or 
is this a central feature of not just human but also of a good part of animal life, which 
can be lost in adulthood, yet remains fundamental? 
 Huizinga takes the latter position, and furthermore connects playfulness to the 
sacred: play is the source of the sacred as sacred play, or archaic religious ritual. Play is 
therefore an extremely ‘serious’ – worthy, noble – matter, being the foundation of order: 
play creates order. Finally, and closing the circle, the order generated by sacred play is not 
simply functional, but it is also beautiful and graceful: ‘[i]n history, art and literature 
everything that we perceive as beautiful noble play was once sacred play’ (p.104). 
 Huizinga substantiates his ‘revaluation of values’ through a series of contrasts 
and dualisms that he partly mobilises, partly reverses, and partly tries to transcend. The 
‘animal vs. human’ and ‘child vs. adult’ oppositions were already examples for this. But 
the book illuminates a number of further such basic dualities, starting with the contrast 
between the ‘playful’ and the ‘serious’. This issue is particularly important for Huizinga, 
as his central proposition is that playfulness should be taken seriously, though he is well 
aware of the inherently paradoxical nature of such a position. The solution is provided 
through one of the central methodological tools offered in the book, returning to aspects 
of Huizinga’s own academic formation as a Sanskrit linguist: etymology and semantics. 
Play is a basic word in all languages, with a rich and intriguing semantic variety. In 
Japanese, the core meaning contrasts playfulness and seriousness, going in hand with a 
central feature of Japanese culture, which on the one hand attributes gravity or 
seriousness to every single aspect of social life, while on the other explicitly considers 
human behaviour as playful in the specific sense of performativity (pp.34-5). Among 
Indo-European languages, the Latin word for play is ludus (of Etruscan origins, just as 
the connected word for mask, persona). It has links to deception and imagination; and 
while, interestingly enough, and probably for this very reason, in all Romance languages 
the word has disappeared as denoting ‘play’ or ‘game’, the root survived in expressions 
such as ‘illusion’, ‘allusion’, ‘collusion’, or ‘delusion’, combining deception, trick and 
fantasy (pp.35-6). Finally, in Semitic languages, the root word for play, la’ab, also stands 
for laughter, but in the special sense of mocking, or laughing at somebody (p.35). 
One aspect must be emphasised here, in order to prevent confusion later: in 
some languages there are a series of term describing game, play, and toy, while in others 
one term captures all. Thus, in languages so different as Italian or Hungarian ‘game’, 
‘play’ and even ‘toy’ are expressed by the same term (gioco or giocattolo in Italian; játék in 
Hungarian). Seriousness, however, especially as a term offered in contrast to playfulness, 
as exemplified by German Ernst, is much less fundamental as a linguistic term; it rather 
looks like a late afterthought (pp.44-5). Huizinga draws the consequences in a particularly 
striking way: ‘the two terms are not of equal value: play is positive, earnest negative. The 
significance of earnest is defined by and exhausted in the negation of “play” […] Play is a 
thing by itself. The play-concept as such is of a higher order than is seriousness. For 
seriousness seeks to exclude play, whereas play can very well include seriousness’ (p.45). 
Huizinga’s conclusive assessment of the priorities between play and seriousness is 
particularly striking. Playfulness not simply merits as much attention as ‘serious’ human 
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activities; it is not an earlier step necessary for the evolution of culture, whether in the 
sense of ontogenesis or phylogenesis; rather, ‘in a sense it is also superior to it or at least 
detached from it. In play we move below the level of the serious, as the child does; but 
we can also move above it – in the realm of the beautiful and the sacred’ (p.19). 
 In order to understand how this genuine ‘transformative magic’ is performed 
through play, we now need to analyse what exactly happens when humans play, 
transcending modern dualisms. Anybody who ever played a game knows it very well that 
playing is serious. Whoever plays genuinely, whether child or adult, always plays with full 
intensity. Not everybody can play, though; and this is one of the gravest defects a human 
being can have, comparable in character to the inability of giving gifts. Any child knows 
that somebody who cannot play cannot become a friend; or, as sociologists would say it 
‘seriously’, that person is not well socialised, is incapable of belonging to any human 
community. But children also very well know the difference between playing a game and 
doing something else. Doing something as a game is different from doing the same thing 
but not as a game; and this difference takes us to the heart of what a game is. Playing is 
not simply ‘free’, just as there is no ‘free gift’ (Douglas 2002); it is rather a peculiar 
combination of freedom and constraint. One is free to enter a game; but playing also 
means to accept a set of rules. Cheating in a game is again comparable to not returning a 
gift: it does not evoke the law, but something much worse, revealing a character fault, 
close to hubris; in the language of the Gospels, it is comparable to a sin committed not 
against the Father or the Son, but against the Holy Spirit, and which cannot be forgiven 
(Mt 12: 31-2).  
 A final characteristic of play, placed at the centre of analysis and given special 
linguistic attention, is that a play (or a game) always has a stake (pp.48-50). It is by this 
‘stake’ that the game returns from its ‘set aside’ place, from its dreamland, to everyday 
reality. This of course is related to ‘winning’ the game, but cannot be reduced to 
whatever the winner is actually gaining; not even to the broader issue of prestige and 
honour. It is revealed by the meaning of ‘stake’ as an object: a piece of wood that 
physically marked, by having being thrust into the ground, the limits within which the 
game was played; and so in this sense the stake is quite close to Greek herma (p.50); or, 
one could add, the Etruscan tular. The main stake of a game is not simply to find a 
winner, in the trivial and mechanical way it has been institutionalised in our times in our 
own societies, where every single game has a winner; rather, the real stake is the setting 
up of limits; the establishing of measure. 
 How exactly play is capable of fulfilling such a vital social role? This question 
leads into the heart of Huizinga’s work. In the analysis that follows much attention will 
be paid to his exact words, but even more to their spirit. 
 
The core of Huizinga’s position is contained in his ideas about the two basic ‘higher 
forms’ of play, which are defined as ‘a contest for something’ and ‘a representation of 
something’ (p.13). The manner in which this idea is introduced in the crucial first chapter 
of the book is particularly significant. The first overview of the central elements of play 
ends with referring to the role played by disguise, dressing up, or mask for play, claiming 
that with it ‘the “extra-ordinary” nature of play reaches perfection’ (p.13), as it refers to 
the transformative aspects of play: somebody disguised or masked does not simply ‘play’ 
another part, but ‘[h]e is another being’ (p.13). The unity of these functions, thus in a way 
the quintessence of playing, is given in ‘a game that “represents” a contest, or else 
becomes a contest for the best representation of something’ (p.13). Thus, by analysing 
the formal characteristics of play, Huizinga gained access to the heart of the two central 
institutions of the modern world: economic competition and representational politics. 
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 These are rooted in the ‘two ever-recurrent forms in which civilization grows in 
and as play’, which are ‘the sacred performance and the festal contest’ (p.48).  
 
Play as con-testing 
 
The links between play and contest are introduced through linguistic analysis. Starting 
with Greek, Huizinga argues that one of the three words used in Greek for play, agon, 
also means contest (p.30), while the same holds true for Chinese (cheng; see p.32), or 
Blackfoot Indian (kachtsi; see p.33).3 In all these cases, apart from being playful, contests 
also included a strong festive component. Adding here Agnes Horvath’s ideas on the 
crucial importance wrestling as mutual testing plays in Plato’s works (Horvath 2010: 207), 
one can restore the meaning of ‘contest’ as ‘con-testing’, or a joint testing, where the 
emphasis is neither on struggle and conflict, nor the selection of a winner, rather the 
maintaining of human relationships in a mutual state of respectful testing and tension. 
 The types of contests that have playful elements are extremely varied; in fact, 
originally and for a long time, all contests included an element of play. This applies first 
of all to warfare, as ‘[e]ver since words existed for fighting and playing, men have been 
wont to call war a game’ (p.89). Both playful contest and actual fighting also particularly 
strongly characterise aspects of erotic life (p.43). Contests also played a major role in the 
development of knowledge. Gaining knowledge was traditionally closely connected to 
the solving of riddles, of which the myth of the sphinx represents one of the best-known 
examples.4 Finding the solution to a riddle always represented something more than 
following straightforward logical procedures; it had the element of a sudden intuition, 
which had vision-like qualities (p.110). Philosophical contests were central aspects of 
philosophical life, from the time of the Sophists up to medieval scholastic disputes and 
beyond (p.116-8).  
 But perhaps the most evident, and also most puzzling, area of social life where 
contests always and everywhere played a central role was the law. The legal system is 
outside ordinary life, which may explain why archaic justice was less concerned with 
ethical considerations and more with the restoration of order (p.78). Greek etymology 
again offers particularly helpful insights. Concerning the etymology of the Greek term 
for justice, given the evident links with the word for dice (both dike), Jaeger came up with 
the unlikely suggestion that the abstract meaning was the original one. Given his broad 
comparative perspective and the series of examples mentioned in his chapter, Huizinga 
has no problems in accepting that the Greek term for justice was derived from the 
casting of a dice (pp.79-80). After all, even Heraclitus defined ‘Zeus’ as a child playing 
dice. In a broader context, the Hebrew word Torah has the same etymology in casting 
lots; while in the Mahabharata, the classic Sanskrit epic poem, ‘the world itself is 
conceived as a game of dice’, while its main action evolves around such game, played in a 
particularly striking setting: in a simple circle, drawn on the ground (p.57).  
 The most significant example, however, which both helps to round up the 
argument and move it close to the next section, is given by the etymological analysis of 
the common Dutch term for marriage ceremony (huwelijk, meaning literally ‘wedding 
play’; pp.41-2). The term ‘lijk’ can be traced back to one of the Indo-European roots for 
play, leik, which stands for all kinds of play referring to bodily exercise and rhythmic 
movement, including dancing, and especially the sense of ‘leaping’, confirming another 
insight by Plato concerning play: it is based on the need of all young creatures, humans as 
well as animals, to leap (p.37, referring to Laws 653D-E).5 The Anglo-Saxon versions of 
the word also mean sacrifice, offering and gift (p.41); while the starting point of this 
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semantic development has already been identified by the Grimm brothers in a highly 
peculiar practice: sword dancing (p.42).  
 Far from being restricted to trivial areas of human life, playful contests extended 
to and even dominated its central aspects. They performed a civilizing role, where 
Huizinga’s ideas can be compared to those of Norbert Elias (2000[1939]). However, 
Huizinga captured better than Elias the single most important civilisatory function of 
playful contests: the manner in which they promote human excellence in the sense of 
perfection and virtue (aréte; see p.63): ‘[t]he primary thing is the desire to excel others’ 
(p.50). Games or playful contests are functional and ‘serious’ as they promote excellence 
by elevating those individuals who manage to assert under fair and equal conditions their 
own qualities; and such a system of individual selection is socially functional in the sense 
that it contributes to the creation of genuine nobleness, fundamental for finding a way to 
promote the common good. 
 
Representation, ceremony 
 
Huizinga again starts by innovatively applying linguistics. The English term ‘play’ is 
derived from plega, plegan which means ‘play’ as well as ‘rapid movement’, ‘gesture’, and 
‘clapping of hands’ (pp.38-9). The German word pflegen ‘care, nurse’ is also derived from 
an Old Saxon term plegan, but academic etymologists refuse to consider a connection 
between these two terms, arguing about a purely formal correspondence, or homology. 
This is because Old Saxon plegan had a series of meanings that they were not able to 
connect to play. These include ‘to take a risk’ or ‘to expose oneself to danger, the oldest 
sense; ‘to bind or engage oneself’, or to ‘take care of’; finally, and in various meanings, 
‘the performance of a sacred act’ (p.39). Connecting such ‘playful’ and ‘serious’ meanings 
poses no problems for Huizinga, and so he argues that it was the same original term that 
developed in England into a concrete, while in continental Germanic languages into a 
more abstract direction, revealing the same unity between playfulness and sacred 
performance. We should add here that risk and danger are also aspect associated with the 
etymological root of experience (*per) as a dangerous passage, evoking liminality and also 
rituals as ‘rites of passage’ (Szakolczai 2008a), thus connecting playfulness to the core 
meaning of lived experience. 
 Taking this connection further, play for Huizinga is a ritual, which first of all 
means actual involvement and participation. Huizinga quotes here Jane Harrison: ritual ‘ 
“is more methectic than mimetic.” ’ (p.15). This participatory experience at its most basic 
level emerges in the context of a very special kind of ritual: the ‘sacred performance’, so 
characteristic of archaic cultures, which is not simply ‘an actualization in appearance only, 
a sham reality; it is also more than a symbolical actualization – it is a mystical one’ (p.14) 
Here follows one of the most important sentences of the book, Huizinga’s capturing of 
the nature of ritual as sacred play: ‘In it, something invisible and inactual takes beautiful, 
actual, holy form’ (p.14). The passage requires careful analysis. 
 Participation is real: it involves our passing through our own life; the concrete 
events, the lived experiences by which we become what we are. A ritual, however, is 
staged: it follows a pre-arranged scenario in which the actors and the audience, whether 
they are separate or identical, go through a series of pre-established motions; where 
everybody knows at the beginning what is going to happen at the end. How can this 
participation be more than the result of imitation and tricks? 
 This happens, first of all, through a key word in the sentence quoted above: 
beauty. A proper sacred performance must evoke the experience of beauty, and even if 
what we see is a performance, not a real event, our experience of beauty immediately 
	   8 
makes it real, by spiritually transfiguring the staged scene into a piece of reality; even into 
a reality of higher order than ‘mere’ everyday life. The encounter with beauty is always 
moving; in extremis, it moves us to tears, making tears of joy, beyond laughter, into the 
most characteristic human gesture expressing playfulness. 
 Second, however, a sacred performance also has another, different and just as 
important connection to reality: in its original form it is not artificially invented, but is 
rooted in an original event; and an event of particular, cosmogonic importance (pp.14-5). 
Huizinga’s comments on the exact nature of this representation are so important that 
they must be quoted in full: ‘The word “represents”, however, does not cover the exact 
meaning of the act, at least not in its looser, modern connotation; for here 
“representation” is really identification, the mystic repetition or re-presentation of the event’ 
(p.15; emphasis in original). 
 The starting point is another crucial recognition by Huizinga: a central 
component of the archaic experience of life is seizure: or the feeling of ‘being seized on, 
thrilled, enraptured’ (p.16). The participatory aspect of rituals can only work if 
participants are literally ‘captured’ or possessed during performance, meaning that they 
manage to feel as if they were present at the original event itself. This also implies that 
this event must have involved the same kind of experience. Furthermore, and again in 
contrast to Girard, Huizinga emphasises beauty. The origins of religious experiences and 
their sacred performance – thus, the origins of culture – cannot be reduced to the 
victimage mechanism and rituals of sacrifice, no matter how important this particular 
case was in history. There was a much more basic, truly original, and very different kind 
of religious experience – positive, not negative; uplifting, not lethargy-generating – by 
which ‘something invisible and inactual’ took beautiful, graceful, ennobling form: this 
was the original experience of a divine epiphany by those who actually witnessed it, and 
who then continued to reproduce it in their festive rituals; a particularly clear and 
important example being Minoan Crete. 
 The proper evocation of an original event involves something more; another 
basic characteristic of human beings, another anthropological fundament: imagination 
(pp.129-30). Imagination is required both at the level of the singular intellect, putting the 
event into form; and at the level of participants who manage to re-live imaginatively the 
experience. The link between play and imagination is one of the basic tenets of the type 
of ‘fundamental anthropology’ promoted by Huizinga, further illuminating the central, 
joint meaning of beauty and participation. 
 The imaginary re-enacting of original events, foundational for culture before and 
beyond the sacrificial mechanism, is rendered possible by poetry; and the experience of 
participation is helped in particular by music. The Greeks captured the divine aspect of 
poetic inspiration through the Muses, which was upheld by Plato in the Ion. Huizinga’s 
work helps to shed further lights on two crucial aspects of archaic poetry. First, the 
composition of poetry often involved playful contests (p.124). Poetic imagination was 
always playful; it was ‘born in and as play’, and as ‘sacred play’, always ‘verging on gay 
abandon, mirth and jollity’ exactly due to and not in spite of its sacred character (p.122). 
Second, and for the same reason, it performed a social function far more important than 
routine everyday drudgery, as it contributed to making and keeping alive culture itself. 
 Huizinga was not deluding us: he managed to substantiate, and in great detail, 
that human culture was born out of play, even of sacred play, and of the most joyful, 
self-abandoned, spirited kind of play which only is capable of creating beautiful, graceful, 
harmonious order; not some rigid, formal, structural ‘order without meaning’ (Voegelin), 
prescribed by written laws and maintained by a specific force like the police. 
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Huizinga and the Romantics 
 
But is not all this romantic daydreaming? Huizinga spent considerable efforts in 
distinguishing his own approach from that of the Romantics, without condemning them 
in a wholesale manner. Many elements of his approach – aesthetics, imagination, the 
importance attributed to poetry and music – are indeed shared (p.135, 164). However, 
the Romantics can’t be followed, as they were part of the schismogenesis of modern 
culture, based on accepting a ‘choice’ between playfulness and seriousness; Puritan rigour 
or Romantic irresponsibility. Huizinga even here offers us some hints, as the last two 
chapters of the book offer a fascinating historical account on ‘Western Civilization Sub 
Specie Ludi’, or under the sign of playfulness, showing how European culture lost its own 
playful origins. 
The harmony between playfulness and seriousness persisted from Antiquity 
through the medieval and Renaissance times; Huizinga perceives the first major sign of 
disturbance with the Baroque of the 17th century. There were few instances in world 
history that were as much dominated by a concern with ceremony, ritual etiquette, but 
also formal beauty and grace, elegance, and playful entertainment, as in the theatre, ballet, 
opera, dance and music of the absolutist courts of the 17th century (pp.182-5). But at the 
same time the formal aspects of ritualistic ceremonies went beyond the edge, and became 
as if ossified into a world of exaggerated artificiality, where everybody in the court 
became his or her own mask (see also Elias 1983[1969]); though hypocrisy only became a 
total social fact in modern media-driven mass democracy. It is this suffocating feeling of 
artificiality that gave rise to an opposite excess, its schismogenic pair, the romantic search 
for authenticity and autonomy, the exaltation of personal experience and true sentiments, 
first formulated in the philosophy of Rousseau, the father of both Kantian philosophy, 
with its obsessive search for the ‘autonomy’, and German Romanticism, but whose most 
important, epochal antecedent belongs to the heart of the court of Louis XIV. This can 
be found in the paintings of Antoine Watteau (1684-1721), which emerged ‘as a protest 
against stiffness and artificiality and a vindication of all that was natural and innocent’, 
and where ‘the germ of Rousseauism and Romanticism’ can be located (p.185). 
 The last chapter argues that while the play element did not disappear from our 
world, the balance between playfulness and seriousness was further damaged. A central 
aspect of modern life is the growing importance of sport; but what started as ‘pure fun’ 
was increasingly turned into a permanent and ‘serious’ kind of activity, the central aspect 
being ‘the transition from occasional amusement to the system of organized clubs and 
matches’ (p.196). Far from restoring the play element at the heart of social life, this 
development is part of a more generalised movement towards increased confusion: 
‘[b]usiness becomes play’, while at the same time ‘play becomes business’ (p.200). The 
same confusion characterises modern art, torn apart between the excesses of a hunt for 
pleasurable sensation on the one hand, and the idolisation of art as a substitute religion 
on the other (p.202).  
The single most important factor promoting such excesses and imbalance is the 
rise of the propaganda machinery, where the forces of science and technology are 
deployed in the service of mechanisation, advertising, and sensation-mongering in 
general (p.202). The sad effects of propaganda are nowhere visible so clearly than in the 
‘Puerilism’ characteristic of contemporary politics, a name he chose for ‘that blend of 
adolescence and barbarity which has been rampant all over the world for the last two or 
three decades’ (p.205), meaning the period starting after WWI. 
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3. Debureau: the re-birth of Pierrot as suffering victim 
 
The first case study will demonstrate how one of the main masks Commedia dell’Arte, 
Pierrot was re-born in Paris, in the 1820s, as a deeply problematic Romantic response to 
the disillusionment with revolutionary dreams.6 Jean-Gaspard Debureau was born in 
1796 in Bohemia. He came to call himself Baptist, which is not without significance 
given that the Zanni figure he resurrected in post-Revolutionary France was traced to 
medieval carnival representations of St John the Baptist, while the image of a decapitated 
Pierrot would obsess fin-de-siècle decadents. His father, native of Amiens, was a vagabond, 
having served in the Austrian army and then leading a theatrical troupe mostly consisting 
of his own sons, born of different relationships. Debureau duly performed his first 
shows as ‘a clown of the public square’ (Storey 1985: 5-6). It was this ‘troupe of nomadic 
tumblers and rope-dancers’ that appeared in Paris in 1814, and would join in 1819 the 
just-formed Funambule (tightrope-walker) Theatre (Storey 1978: 94).  
For a considerable time the two threads were not connected. German 
Romanticism was transplanted into France by the problematic figure of Mme de Stael, 
remaining a phenomenon of the Salons, light years away from the suburban popular 
circus-like Funambule. Their joining was helped by the increasing affinity between the 
general mood by the late 1820s and the spirit of German Romanticism, which became 
suddenly championed by poets of the emerging literary avant-garde like Nerval and 
Nodier.  Following the lead of de Stael, they were particularly interested in theatre, 
especially Goethe’s Faust and the new approach to Shakespeare pioneered by Lessing and 
Tieck, as alternative to the French classicism preferred by Voltaire; and in the related 
obsession with dreams characteristic again of Tieck and especially Jean-Paul. Central to 
this Romanticism was an escapism from the crisis of their times, marked by 
disillusionment about the promises of the Revolution and a cult of the precocious 
Romantic genius, which in the cases of both Tieck and Nerval resulted in the immature 
assumption of major projects that literally crippled their career and life: Tieck started to 
write a book on Shakespeare when 19, translating first Shakespeare’s last work, The 
Tempest, and propagating a misreading of Shakespeare as its deep truth; while Nerval 
similarly published his translation of the first part of Goethe’s Faust when he was 20, 
ignoring the fact that Goethe spent decades finalising this first part, and left the 
publication of the second after his death. Driven by Romantic hubris, Tieck and Nerval 
thought themselves superior to Shakespeare and Goethe; thus, instead of sparking a new 
Renaissance, which was indeed promised by the work of Schleiermacher and Schlegel 
(Gadamer 1998), they rather became forerunners of decadence and the politics of 
miming which would culminate in the ‘revolutions’ of the 20th century. 
Nodier discovers Debureau: Romantics and mimes 
 
This Romantic spirit encountered the new, mime Pierrot by accident in July 1828 when, 
pressed by his daughter, Nodier entered the Funambule to see a show entitled Le Boeuf 
enragé. The review he published about his experience represents the apotheosis of 
Debureau’s Pierrot among the literary avant-garde, culminating in the mime-play ‘The 
Golden Dream’ he wrote and had performed in the same year. Significantly, he failed to 
own both the first review and the play, published anonymously, though it was generally 
agreed then, as now, that he was author of both. 
Nodier’s review contains two points of exceptional interest. First, he captured the 
figure with striking precision, using a highly peculiar and revealing language, without 
realising the significance of what he actually was saying. According to this, Debureau’s 
Pierrot was “ ‘a character whose infinite nuances are difficult to render. Ingenuous like a 
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child, cowardly, crafty, lazy, mischievous by instinct, obliging, jeering, gluttonous, 
thieving, blustering, greedy, clumsy, ingenious in the arts that tend to the satisfaction of 
his tastes: he is a naïve and clownish Satan.’ ” (Storey 1978: 97); while what he enjoyed 
most in Deburau’s Pierrot was its ‘ “broad Pulcinella-like streak of perversity” ’ (Storey 
1985: 75-8). It was the embodiment of the ‘demonic clown’ archetype – but Nodier 
evidently just loved it. Second, in his concluding sentences Nodier formulated the 
blackmail hook that would become trademark of the radical avant-garde: this theatre is 
not yet fashionable, and ‘intellectuals’ would need to resist their own reservations to go 
and see it; however, he promises that those who gathered the courage to enter, will 
return. Here again Nodier captures well the obsessive nature of the show, without 
realizing that a desire to return does not justify the original entry. 
 A central aspect of Nodier’s infatuation with mime theatre was his personal 
obsession with Columbine (Storey 1985: 74). Nodier was certainly an extremely peculiar 
person, who evidently had morbid longings for his daughter, considering her wedding as 
his own death, and wishing to be buried in her wedding veil (Storey 1985: 80), while 
being also attracted to the ‘mystery’ of Pulcinella, devoting his most obsessive stories like 
‘Idiot’ and ‘Polichinelle’ to him, which were fully serious, not meant as parodies (Ibid.: 
80-8). Similarly to Tieck, his entire life was lived in a fantasmagoria of dreams, especially 
erotic dreams, while his most famous novel was devoted to the theme of the ‘forbidden 
fruit’, claiming that morality and chastity are only hypocritical masks, and the novel 
finished in a full-scale confusion of dream and reality (Béguin 1939: 456-66). Still, the 
obsession for Columbine was by no means limited to him, but encompassed such giants 
of European art as Dickens and Baudelaire (Cuppone 1999: 48-9), arguably the most 
important artists in the 19th century in their respective countries; artists whose life cannot 
be fully understood without such obsession. Shakespeare and Tiepolo again proved right: 
comedy remodelled European society from the top to the bottom; and the central 
question any artist and academic must pose concerning to this fact, touching the heart of 
one’s own being, is responsibility. The Debureau cult possibly reached its height in a 
1842 review of Gautier, ‘Shakespeare at the Funambules’, which compared the 
pantomime The Old Cloths Peddler to Hamlet and Macbeth (Borowitz 1984: 24). While the 
perception of an affinity between Shakespeare and Commedia dell’Arte was correct, 
revealing the sensitivity of Romantics, the interpretation was radically faulty: Shakespeare 
tried to spiritualise and transcend the mime origins of theatre, while the French 
Romantics regressed from Shakespeare into the glorification of mere buffoonery. 
 The Romantic exaltation of Debureau’s Pierrot would not have been effective 
had it not have its twin in its glorification as representative of the ‘people’ (Lehmann 
1967: 212-3; Storey 1985: 4-5). This was accomplished contemporaneously in a 1832 
book by Jules Janine, ‘that most fashionable of critics’, which became the ancestor of the 
cult of popular genre by high-brow critics, though its ‘self-conscious “camp” attitude to 
its subject, revealing the critic’s self-satisfied daring in shocking conventional opinion [… 
which] caused a furore of indignation and turned Debureau into the idol of the 
fashionable avantgarde’ (Haskell 1972: 7). Thus the figure, lifted from its original, rustic 
setting, became representative of the revolutionary dream, on its way towards the symbol 
of the proletarian. The point of intersection between these two poles, the diabolical 
trickster and the suffering victim, capture the heart of Debureau’s Pierrot: the 
glorification of the outsider as outsider; the absurd apotheosis of the ‘pathetic moon-
struck outcast’ (Lehmann 1967: 210). This is again captured in a piece Gautier, who in 
1847 argued that ‘Debureau’s Pierrot had a timeless and universal meaning, embodying 
“the ancient slave, the modern proletarian, the pariah, the passive and disinherited being” 
’ (as in Borowitz 1984: 24). 
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 Performing such a feat, keeping together so different exigencies, requires an actor 
of capacity; and Debureau was indeed described by Théophile Gautier, with the 
understatement so characteristic of Romantics, as ‘ “the most perfect actor who ever 
lived” ’ (as in Storey 1978: 94). Still, Gautier was no small figure in the history of art, 
inventor of the term l’art pour l’art and best friend of Baudelaire who dedicated to him his 
Flowers of Evil, inaugural book of modern poetry. 
 So what kind of actor, and person, was ‘Baptiste’? 
Debureau as a mime and as a human being 
 
Given that he was evidently an able performed, and that actors anyway only enact roles, 
questions related to his personality would seem inappropriate. Yet, already 
contemporaries became deeply aware that ‘the violent and sometimes sinister cruelty that 
Deburau brought to his role had at least part of its source in the brooding rancor of his 
own temperament’ (Storey 1978: 115). This became particularly evident in a famous 
spring 1836 incident, when he killed a young street-boy who mocked him. He was 
acquitted in what was probably the first case of intellectual mobilization for an avant-
garde ‘hero’ who was presumed to be beyond the law. The significance of the case merits 
a long quote from his biographer, Tristan Rémy: while “on stage, Deburau was ‘neither 
gay, nor sinister,’ he concedes that ‘the face and gestures of Jean-Gaspard [Deburau] 
showed, each time a scene gave him the occasion, that he was reckoning with a world 
that he made laugh at will, he whom the world had never made laugh. His liberated 
rancor burst out on stage especially when, under his floured mask, he expressed his 
whole personality. Only in this way could he reveal those parts of himself that he kept 
contained. The bottle whose label «Laudanum» he smilingly revealed after Cassandre had 
drained it, the back of the razor he passed over the old man’s neck, were toys which he 
could not be allowed to take seriously and thus put to the test his patience, his reserve, 
his sang-froid. […] When he powdered his face, his nature, in fact, took the upper hand. 
He stood then at the measure of his life – bitter, vindictive, unhappy’ ” (as in Storey 
1978: 104-5). 
 Concerning the nature of the character, both on and off stage, two famous 
episodes gain new light through the argument presented so far. First, in a probably 
apocryphal though personally diffused story he claimed that the first happy event of his 
life, awakening him to his own identity was when playing in Constantinople before the 
curtained Harem he climbed on the Perilous Ladder and managed to spy at the semi-
nude odalisques (Storey 1985: 6). Both the place, Constantinople and the act of 
voyeuristic watching as a key to happiness is emblematic. The second concerns the 
inventing of the figure. Here again it is necessary to insert a longer quote, this time from 
the classic book of Séverin: ‘ “Without letting fall a word, one evening, for himself alone, 
[Debureau] powdered the shine of his white greasepaint to a perfect whiteness and 
dullness. Something was lacking in this mask. What? The eyebrows and eyes accentuated 
with black. That was better already. What more? Some rouge on the lips to offset the 
white. Better and better, already captivating, and yet it was not complete. What had to be 
added? Ah! the black skullcap of Yacomo’s Harlequin. And oh! miracle! Pierrot was 
born. The spirit of the mimus albus of Rome had passed into Deburau” ’ (as in Storey 
1978: 95). Here the central point concerns the possessive aspects of wearing a mask, or 
even of a painted face: the account is a century earlier than Pizzorno’s classic essay on 
the mask (Pizzorno 2010), and yet presents the exact same argument. 
 
Thus, Debureau the actor and Debureau the human being can’t be separated, as Pierrot 
on stage was Debureau, more true to his self than the mask he wore in ordinary life to 
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cover the ugly deficiencies of his personality, while the real Debureau was the stage 
Pierrot. Such washing together of real person and stage personality, combined with the 
implied glorifying of victimhood and suffering, of the outcast outsider, of the perpetrator 
who is also a victim, had tremendous consequences. The most direct was the fascination 
with the possible staging of the ‘real’ Deburau. Deburau could not completely make his 
own character appear on stage, playing ‘ “a character who embodied an all too personal 
truth” ’ (Rémy, as in Storey 1978: 105-6); but this was done in the 1840 play Marrrchand 
d’habits, by the next great Pierrot actor Dominique Legrand, who staged Debureau, 
capturing ‘the undispelled shadows of Baptiste’s cruelty and daring, the mélange of 
macabre and melodramatic knockabout’, thus miming of a mime (Ibid.: 106). Such 
vertiginous self-referentiality and multiple imitation, probably the first ever theatre play 
about an actor, was spun further in a comedy of errors around a review by Gautier, who 
actually missed the first act but read into it his own Romantic dream-world, and with his 
‘fine, ironic intelligence’ made it into a ‘coherent and arresting synthesis’ (Ibid.). This 
review so ‘skillfully […] transmute[d the] worn puerilities’ of the play, trivialising for e.g. 
the murder committed in it, that when in 1896 Séverin revived it, the programme 
identified Gautier as its author (Ibid.: 108). 
Yet, a truly great actor also had to be a personality. As he lacked it, Debureau 
used simple yet ingenuous trick: he stylised his performance to the extreme, reducing the 
character to a formula (Clayton 1993: 34), performing on stage marionette figure. This 
would have vital consequences for avant-garde theatre; just as his playing with his radical 
shifts of mood. 
After the decline of Baptiste Pierrot’s figure of was taken up by his son Charles 
who did not simply continue it rather created its schismatic double. Lacking the brutal 
vitality of Baptiste, Charles was – on stage just as in real life – nervous, slender and sickly, 
a typical neurotic with suicidal tendencies, for whom life is a nightmare, lived as an 
‘endless protest and threats of revenge against the careless malice of the world’ 
(Lehmann 1967: 214). He moved the figure a bit away from the ‘people’ and close to a 
Hamlet captured as image of the ‘precarious outcast’ (Ibid.). The figure, however, already 
with Charles, and especially the other imitators and epigones of Baptiste, became 
excessively sentimental, moving towards decadence and triviality.  
In a crucial remark Storey argues that the key role played by Deburau ‘in the 
transmission of the type from the popular to the literary world’, and ‘in the 
transformation from naïf to neurasthenic pariah’ is still not understood (Storey 1978: 94). 
The history of miming presented so far already demonstrated the validity of the comedy 
version of Einstein’s law that demonic energy never disappears only alters shape, finding 
always new vehicles. 
 
The mime from theatre to literature: stages in the commedification of the world 
 
After 1860 the mime figure moved from the theatre to literature. The two central 
documents and operators of this new Pierrot were a curious novel by Henri Rivière, 
Pierrot: Caïn, influenced by Gautier’s account of Marrrchand d’habits, published in 1860; 
and Gaspard of the Night: Fantasies in the manner of Rembrandt and Callot by Aloysius Bertrand, 
first published posthumously in 1842, but becoming influential after 1860. 
Rivière’s book marks a new primacy of the written word over not simply theatre 
but mime play.  It is the story of a young mime who ‘conceives of Pierrot as the “fallen 
angel” ’, as he became ‘struck by the audacity and sinister gaiety of Baptiste’s 
performance’ (Storey 1978: 111-2). Thus, ‘as he later explains to his friend, “there began 
to take shape slowly in my brain a genius of evil, grandiose and melancholic, or an 
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irresistible seductiveness, cynical one instant and clownish the next – in order to raise 
himself up still higher after having fallen” ’ (Ibid.: 112). This is followed by a love affair 
with Columbine and the decapitating of a rival during a performance, culminating in a 
self-confession before the public that what he brought to the role was ‘ “the genius of 
madness” ’ (Ibid.). 
 Bertrand is credited as the inventor of prose poem, and his life (including 
authoring a posthumous masterpiece) contained everything needed for a Romantic myth. 
He was a typical representative of the mid-19th century state of spirit: an ‘errant mind, 
fantasising, melancholic, theatrical and ironic’ (Rizzo 2003: 128). His bizarre, labyrinthine 
imagination mixed together contemporary themes with medieval architecture, where 
even flâneurs are lost. For him Rembrandt was a Romantic genius, ‘ “an alchemist of the 
colour, and a magician of the light” ’, while Callot’s incisions are remarkable for depicting 
‘a clown-like, grotesque, fantastic and completely/ prettamente theatrical world’ (Ibid.: 
128-9). In the book Commedia dell’Arte gestures are pushed to their extreme, including a 
play with a book within a book, written by the devil under the threat of Pulcinella (Ibid.: 
131), and the crowning of a mad king during a grotesque masked ball (Ibid.: 136). It is 
this same process that is capture by a central figure of the ‘golden age of caricature’ in 
France, Paul Gavarni, who devoted an entire series to Pierrot as being emblematic of 
Paris, new capital of carnival bypassing Venice, with its ‘ “infernal gallop – a regular 
round of the Sabbath of Pleasure” ’ (Borowitz 1984: 27, quoting Gautier), centring on 
masked balls that became especially sensual with the introduction of the cancan from 
Algeria in 1831 (Ibid.: 25-6). 
4. Meyerhold: Biomechanics as the avant-garde taylorisation of theatre 
 
Meyerhold clearly and uncompromisingly formulated his ars poetica, revealing artist and 
his work at the same time and in harrowingly disturbing ways. According to Meyerhold, 
as ‘[t]he public expects invention, play-acting and skill’ of the theatre, and not a ‘slavish 
imitation life’, artists must move away from reality by ‘carefully choosing a mask, 
donning a decorative costume, and showing off one’s brilliant tricks to the public – now 
as a dancer, now as the intrigant at some masquerade, now as the fool of old Italian 
comedy, now as a juggler’ (Meyerhold 1969: 130). 
Every major word in this short paragraph is profoundly problematic. It starts by 
characterising the artist as a slave: not of imitation as a task, but to the ‘public’ that must 
be ‘satisfied’ at all costs. It do not yet have the demagogy of ‘market value’ or the 
‘taxpayer’s money’; and it is clear enough that a work of art is made to be appreciated. 
But why by ‘the public’? How can ‘the’ public judge a work of art; immediately, at the 
spot? Any possible educational sense of culture, the heart of European civilization since 
the Greeks, is thus immediately rendered irrelevant, reduced to the provocation of 
laughter, characteristic of a circus or the Hippodrome. After such arch-betrayal, it is less 
surprising that three of the most important values of European culture are subtly abused 
and appropriated. It is care – which is reduced to the selection of a way of disguise, a 
frozen face; it is gift-giving, which here means the taking up of another way, a theatrical 
costume (the Italian word being maschera, identical with mask); and finally brilliance, the 
gift of talent, delivered to the service of tricks. Meyerhold does not even feel a sense of 
shame for explicitly proliferating illusionism; and this is the perspective from which lists 
the four archetypal artists of his theatre, sources and effects of Commedia dell’Arte. 
 
From actor back to the mime 
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Given that Meyerhold’s philosophy of theatre is acting reduced to pulling tricks, it is 
reasonable to assume that his purported return to the ‘pure’ sources of theatre is also 
nothing but a trick. That this is indeed so is best visible through his glorification of 
cabotinage, and in his confusing the origins of Commedia dell’Arte amongst charlatans and 
buffoons with medieval mystery plays. A ‘cabotin’ is a second-rate, strolling actor or 
charlatan; but when his style of acting was dismissively described by this word he proudly 
took it up as a praise, claiming that ‘a cabotin is a kinsman to the mime, the histrion, and 
the juggler; the cabotin can work miracles with his technical mastery; the cabotin keeps 
alive the tradition of the true art of acting’; even evoking the story of Reynard the fox 
(Meyerhold 1969: 122), now widely identified as the central medieval trickster figure, 
whose story was taken up by Goethe in 1792-4, capturing his falling out with the French 
Revolution (Varty 1967, 2000). Far from being a mere aside, it captures the ‘revaluation 
of values’ at the heart of Meyerhold’s project, oriented against the classical tradition of 
‘inspirational’ acting. This style of acting – which Meyerhold simply fails to grasp, as he 
identifies it with playing merely according to ‘subjective mood’ (Meyerhold 1969: 129) – 
is result of a long ‘civilisational process’ by which mere mime origins of European 
theatre were transformed and spiritualised, implying in the spirit of Dilthey’s philosophy, 
personal empathy with the person represented on stage; an affinity with the experience 
of the original character and the playwright, thus transmitted to the audience, in the 
Platonic sense of the interpretive rings (see Ion), thus transforming theatre mere spectacle 
into a participatory experience, resurrecting the original sense of classical Greek theatre. 
Meyerhold’s propagation of Commedia dell’Arte is regressive, all the more so as, through 
the recapturing of the spirit of Callot through ETA Hoffman and Tieck, it directly and 
self-consciously plunges back to the fairground sources of Commedia dell’Arte, the 
charlatan and the mime.  
This seems counterbalanced by the purported return to medieval mystery plays, 
also championed by Evreinov. This, however, only indicates and proliferates further 
misunderstanding. Mystery plays were not pure spectacles, but genuine rituals, where a 
condition of access was participation in the religious substance of the performance. 
Meyerhold missed this participatory component exactly in the same way as he missed the 
importance of human personality in ‘inspirational acting’. 
 Such failure reflected serious personality defects. Meyerhold had an extremely 
negative, deprecatory view of human beings and life in general, bemoaning the spiritual 
poverty of mankind and the general vulgarity of life, considering that whatever is said in 
jest is more serious than what was meant seriously, confusing the accidental and the 
regular, dressing up idiosyncratic errors into hidden essences (Moody 1978: 860, 865), 
similarly to Freud. In a revealing passage he considered Molière’s Don Juan as a mere 
mask and puppet of the author, employed as a way ‘to square accounts with his 
innumerable enemies’ (Meyerhold 1969: 133), thus reducing the great artist to the level of 
a Terence, revealing more about himself than about Molière. Meyerhold’s ‘view of the 
human race’ is contained, in condensed form, in the concluding scene of the ‘Fairground 
Booth’, an ‘astonishing coup de theâtre’, in the image of a ‘collection of tragically grotesque 
puppets’ (Moody 1978: 868). 
 
Fairground Booth 
 
This play, written by Blok and pivotal for Meyerhold’s oeuvre, was second in the three 
performances in which he resurrected the spirit of Debureau’s Pierrot on the Russian 
stage, in between his 1903 graduation and the 1910 Carnival, staged by Fokine based on 
Schumann’s music, after which he stayed with the figure (Moody 1978: 860-2), 
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combining it with the mask of Dr Dappertutto, a sinister figure conjured up by ETA 
Hoffmann. It was a kind of manifesto, asserting the comic freedom of the grotesque. 
Central for the effect mechanism of the grotesque, taking up hints from Callot, is the 
persistent mixing of incompatible elements and the accumulation of surprising turns in 
the plot (Meyerhold 1969: 137), thus shocking the audience until its members give up all 
attempt of understanding, thus willing to release their integrity. 
The play was teamed up as a double bill with the ‘Miracle of St Antony’ (Green 
1986: 87), itself a provocation, especially as following even here the example of Callot; 
and was used as a main vehicle for Meyerhold programmatic concern with returning to 
the world of Commedia dell’Arte and the ‘primordial elements of the theatre: the power of 
the mask, gesture, movement and plot’ (Meyerhold 1969: 125). The staging was rendered 
possible by a double coincidence, combining historical and personal liminality: the 
disorientation caused in Russia by the defeat in the war against Japan and the Revolution 
of 1905; and Blok’s disillusionment of with symbolism as an ersatz religion, who fuelled 
all his sourness into the play, ridiculing what he had held sacred. Blok was a great poet 
and genuine human being, who would die in 1925, sick from living in the hallucinatory 
boredom, hypocrisy and madness of Communist Russia, where Meyerhold would strive 
as fish in water. 
 Fairground Booth was a return not to Commedia dell’Arte, but to its parody, where 
the actors where enacting a mechanised caricature of themselves (Green 1986: 90-1). Its 
storyline was inane purposefully, and beyond belief: a group of Mystics, sitting around a 
table, are expecting the arrival of Death as beautiful women, but instead Columbine 
arrives, followed eventually by Harlequin and Pierrot. At the same time, and in 
conformity with Meyerhold attitude to full truthfulness, which combined the shameless 
use of tricks with cynically revealing the technical machinery of theatre, with ‘all the 
ropes and wires [being] visible to the audience’ (Meyerhold 1969: 70). 
With this play Blok and Meyerhold demonstrated that they learned the lesson of 
Debureau and the French Romantic avant-garde: even the most inane plot can be 
declared as work of genius if the self-proclaimed cultural elite declares so – given that the 
sole judge after the French Revolution, ‘the’ Public, proved itself incapable of judging. 
 The final scene was a genuine climax to the anti-theatre, where, as described by 
the actress playing Columbine, ‘ “[t]he curtain fell behind Pierrot-Meyerhold and he was 
left face to face with the audience. He stood staring at them, and it was as though Pierrot 
was looking into the eyes of every single person. … There was something irresistible in 
his gaze. Then Pierrot looked away, took his pipe from his pocket and began to play the 
tune of a rejected and unappreciated heart. That moment was the most powerful in his 
performance. Behind his lowered eyelids one sensed a gaze, stern and full of reproach” ’ 
(as in Green 1986: 92). At that time confusion in judgment and the arts was not yet total, 
and many found the outrageous provocation unacceptable, not knowing yet that within 
less than two decades this would be made into official public policy by the Bolsheviks: it 
resulted in ‘nearly violent scandal in the audience, derision from the critics, outrage from 
the playwright’s betrayed fellow symbolists – and, from many young radicals, deep 
enthusiasm’ (ibid.). 
 The article Meyerhold would write a few years later, apart from giving the 
rationale for his regression to Commedia dell’Arte and beyond, contained a visionary 
insight concerning cinema – or the script of what was enacted soon. In contrast to those 
who considered the cinema as a vehicle for realism, he argued that it rather was 
comparable to the fairground booth which was ‘eternal’ – a claim he immediately 
repeated, using standard rhetorical trick, to hammer the effect – and projected the 
coming return of the clowns with the help of the screen (Meyerhold 1969: 135). This 
would indeed happen soon, in the emerging Hollywood, with Chaplin as its main 
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protagonist. Meyerhold had a considerable impact on Eisenstein, considered as his 
disciple (Moody 1978: 868-9), helped by their shared fascination for Wagner.  
 
Masquerade 
 
Meyerhold’s next major show was again perfectly timed – after 5 years of preparation, 
and with a cast of 200, he staged Lermontov’s Masquerade on 25 February 1917, when the 
first shots of the Revolution were fired; a student was even killed in the vestibule (Green 
1986: 103; Moody 1978: 865). The piece was again masterfully chosen: Meyerhold caught 
a particularly sour work by a great poet, who was despairing over the tragic corruption of 
Russia in the 1830s, presenting it through two masked balls and the ‘ominous Stranger, 
the figure of vengeance (Green 1986: 102). Meyerhold transfused it with his usual 
‘commedic alchemy’ (Ibid.: 107), fixating it into a vicious and cynical vision of the world, 
presenting an ‘extravagantly decadent image of society’ (Ibid.: 102), distilling the ‘dark 
forces’, even ‘ “demonism” ’ out of the play, including the motifs ‘ “murder through 
tears” ’ and ‘ “laughter after murder” ’ (as in Moody 1978: 865), worthy of a Byzantine 
mime of the Hippodrome. Critics immediately identified it as ‘typical of Meyerhold’s 
own decadence and megalomanic extravagance’ (Meyerhold 1969: 80), but to no avail; 
with the Revolution Meyerhold’s time finally has come. 
 
Acting as ‘biomechanics’: unleashing the potential of the demonic clown 
 
Throughout his career Meyerhold was helped by a series of extraordinary historical 
coincidences, working in his favour, whether in 1905/6 or in February 1917. By 1921 the 
devastation of the Civil War created just the right ‘tabula rasa’ to put his ideas into 
practice. This culminated in his truly extraordinary idea of ‘biomechanics’. 
 Meyerhold joined the Communist Party early, in 1918 (Green 1986: 104), and this 
was no sheer opportunism, but based on a shared fascination with industrialisation, 
mechanisation, science, technology, and progress. In particular, his vision of the ‘new 
actor’ rhymed perfectly with the Soviet vision of the ‘new man’: he needed actors who, 
far from searching for ‘ “authentic emotions” ’, rather performed like puppets, 
abstracting from actual life-conduct the ‘mechanism of human behaviour’; actors who 
not simply wore masks, but whose own body would become a mask (Moody 1978: 866). 
The Civil War produced the proper ‘prime material’ for Meyerhold, just as for 
Makarenko, the ‘great educator’ of Soviet Russia, who considered that the best pupils of 
the new socialist education are orphans, as they are not bogged down by old-fashioned 
concerns with family life. So Meyerhold chose his new from 17-18 years old war 
veterans, having fought in the war as teenagers, with low social background, so 
‘understandably, their devotion to the “Master”, as Meyerhold was now known to his 
students, bordered on the fanatical’ (Braun 1995: 170).  
 Meyerhold’s short texts on biomechanics are an extraordinary read today, as one 
cannot possibly image that this could have been considered in its time, and for decades 
after, as manifesto for the theatrical avant-garde. The central idea is that actors should 
mirror the way assembly-linework has become a joyful necessity in the new socialist 
society, thus eliminating the separation between work-time and rest, learning to regulate 
rest and fatigue as efficiently as possible. This must incorporate recent research in 
America, especially the ‘methods of Taylorism’, which should ‘be applied to the work of 
the actor in the same way as they are to any form of work with the aim of maximum 
productivity’, thus promoting ‘[t]he Taylorization of the theatre’ (Meyerhold 1969: 197-
9). He called this method ‘biomechanics’, where actors, instead of building the role from 
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their own emotions, rather study their own ‘innate capacity for reflex excitability’ (Ibid.; italics 
in original), memorizing technical tricks and controlling one’s own physical movement, 
as a result of which an actor can gain a conscious control over the excitation of the 
audience as well: ‘By correctly resolving the nature of his state physically, the actor 
reaches the point where he experiences the excitation which communicates itself to the 
spectator and induces him to share in the actor’s performance: what we used to call 
“gripping” the spectator. It is this excitation which is the very essence of the actor’s art’ 
(Ibid.: 199). Meyerhold duly illustrated his lectures by performances of his students, 
dancing the mechanical pantomime, happily puppetising themselves.  
 The corollary of this was a technique taught by Meyerhold in the 1930s that can 
be literally called ‘out-casting’. According to this, and moving beyond Debureau, in order 
learn ‘correct’ acting, which meant Meyerhold’s constructivist de-naturalisation of normal 
human emotions, actors had to be induced to take up roles against their temperament: 
‘In order to spur and actor into action you sometimes need to set him a paradoxical task 
which he can manage only by discarding his normal criteria’ (Ibid.: 204). Meyerhold, just 
as Nodier, or as any professional pimp, well realised that the technique of transgressing 
boundaries always work: once the integrity of a human being is successfully broken, he 
or she would be entrapped in the act and look at his or her perpetrator, who became 
master by rendering him slave, for future guidance. 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 As a particular game of coincidence, it is worth noting here that Huizinga and Mauss 
were born in the same year, in 1872; and their work on play and gift relations could help 
to re-found anthropology, correcting the serious imbalances introduced by Durkheim 
and Boas, born in 1858, thus only fourteen years their senior. 
2 About this, see Bjorn Thomassen; see also Bateson. 
3 Incidentally, this idea would be the basis of ‘Koyaanisqatsi: Life out of Balance’, the 
1982 film by Godfrey Reggio. 
4 Other, particularly intriguing examples, combining the winning of a hand with the 
solving of a riddle, include Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice and Puccini’s Turandot, where 
some of the most important European artists, in one of their central works, thus 
captured an arche-typal technique. 
5 In many languages (including Greek, Latin and Hungarian) the term for ‘dancing’ 
originally was identical to leaping. All these were pushed out through the term ‘dance’, of 
uncertain origins, during the ‘Dark Ages’; a development that strangely parallels what 
happened with the word ‘mask’. 
6 About this Girard’s analysis is fundamental (Girard 1961). 
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